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CONSTITUTIONAL CONTORTION?
MAKING UNFETTERED WAR POWERS
COMPATIBLE WITH LIMITED
GOVERNMENT
THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE
CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER
9/11. By John Yoo.1 University of Chicago Press. 2005. xii +
366 pp. $29.00
Gordon Silverstein2
War requires strong, centralized and efficient government.
But that same sort of government is a conservative’s worst
nightmare when it comes to domestic policy. This has left conservatives with a stark constitutional conundrum, at least since
the First World War: Must they sacrifice a commitment to limited government in order to play an essential world role? Or,
conversely, must they sacrifice that world role to assure liberty
and limited government at home?
This dilemma literally exploded onto the American political
agenda on September 11, 2001. In the aftermath of that crisis
John Yoo—then a Deputy Assistant Attorney General—
contributed a series of memos articulating legal theories to support the Bush Administration’s assertion of war and treaty powers. Having now returned to his position as Professor of Law at
Berkeley’s Boalt Hall, Yoo has written a comprehensive book
attempting to construct a constitutional justification for this assertion of extraordinarily broad Executive power and yet, at the
same time, a theory that attempts to build barricades against the

1. Professor of Law, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley.
2. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. AB Cornell University 1981; PhD, Harvard University, 1991. Professor Silverstein is
the author of IMBALANCE OF POWERS: CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AND THE
MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1997) and the forthcoming HOW LAW KILLS
POLITICS (W.W. Norton).
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risk that this massive central power might blow back, and erode
constitutional limits at home.
Professor Yoo argues that properly understood, the Constitution as written and ratified not only allows, but expects Presidents to exercise a free hand in foreign lands, giving Presidents
nearly unlimited powers in war, along with virtually unconstrained authority to interpret or even terminate treaties such as
defense pacts with Taiwan, Anti-Ballistic Missile agreements,
the Geneva Convention Accords on the Treatment of Prisoners
and the U.N. Convention Against Torture.3 But this very same
Constitution, Yoo argues, limits the creeping spread of global
governance and the risk it poses to limited government and individual liberty at home.
Professor Yoo’s theory rejects a reliance on original intent
or meaning as expressed by the constitution’s authors, building a
fairly open-textured “original understanding” of those who ratified the document in the States to support his view. It was this
understanding, shaped by that generation’s own experiences,
education and cultural context that Yoo believes should guide us
through the Constitution’s more ambiguous phrases when it
comes to war and foreign affairs.
A thoughtful conservative scholar and professor, Yoo insists
that the Constitution—at least in foreign affairs—has evolved in
ways very much in keeping with the distribution of power those
who ratified the Constitution might well have “anticipated” and
well understood (p. 295). He frequently asserts these sorts of
presumptions: “Struggle over the powers of war and peace
would have remained at the center of the Framers’ memories of
British political history” (p. 46); “In considering the foreign affairs power, the Framers would have looked to recent British political history as much as to intellectual thought on the separation of powers” (p. 45); and “a majority of the Framers probably
believed that the president enjoyed a ‘protective power’” (p.
100); to note just a few of many.
Yoo’s claim is that when it came to the powers of war, the
framing generation (if not the framers themselves) “would have”
3. Third Geneva Convention of 1949 Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. The Fourth Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 46, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. The United Nations Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 113. The United States signed the Convention in April, 1988, and it was ratified on October 21, 1994.
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understood the relationship of Congress and President “to mimic
the British forms of government” (p. 65). Yoo makes a powerful
case that the founding generation, steeped in English law and
Parliamentary history and fearful of the anarchy threatening to
disintegrate the young nation under its original charter of government, built a new government that would be able to confront
these dangers. The answer they came up with, Yoo argues, was
to recreate the relationship between King and Parliament. There
are striking parallels—and Yoo does a service by pointing them
out—but there are profoundly striking differences that he largely
ignores.
In England, the Crown alone decided on when to go to war,
and how to fight. But this power was checked by Parliament’s
control of the purse strings. Therefore, Yoo concludes, since
Congress today retains ultimate control of the purse-strings, and
since (at least in practice) the Executive has assumed the initiative in war powers and foreign policy, we should maintain this
division of labor.
There are two problems here. First, does this division of
power accurately reflect the constitutional design? And second,
was the allocation of powers he focuses on the means or the
ends? In other words, was the division of initiative and finance
the objective in this institutional design—or was that merely the
means employed to balance the two branches of government? If
it was the later, then our focus ought to be on maintaining this
balance rather than any particular distribution of specific powers.
The originalism question turns, of course, on just what sort
of originalism you find compelling. The original intent, original
meaning, or, as Yoo would have it, the original understanding?
Yoo insists that there was a broad desire to replicate the relationship between Parliament and the King in the new relationship of Congress and President. In England, the Crown determined War and Peace; and Parliament checked this power by
controlling the purse strings. Just the same in the new Constitution: Congress would have the ultimate check against an imperial
president since Congress alone could raise taxes and authorize
spending from the U.S. Treasury. No money, no war.
Of course the founding generation could not escape it’s own
experiences and education. Thomas Jefferson acknowledged
that there were “some among us who would now establish a
monarchy,” but these people, Jefferson insisted, are “inconsiderable in number and weight of character.” Jefferson admitted that
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his own generation was “educated in royalism,” but “our young
people are educated in republicanism. An apostasy from that to
royalism is unprecedented and impossible.”4
Though they built their new government on old foundations, the institutions they put in place were anything but the sort
of replica Yoo asserts the ratifiers “would have” intended or
embraced. As James Madison made clear in The Federalist No.
37, the founding generation was also painfully conscious of how
inadequate were the existing models on which they might build
their new system. All “the other confederacies which could be
consulted as precedents” throughout human history had failed,
Madison noted, and could “furnish no other light than that of
beacons, which give warning of the course to be shunned, without pointing out that which ought to be pursued.”5 The most the
Americans could do, Madison insisted, was “to avoid the errors
suggested by the past experience of other countries,” and try to
develop new institutions that might be as self-correcting as possible, that would “provide a convenient mode of rectifying” our
own errors “as future experiences may unfold them.”6 It seems,
then, that though the Americans surely were influenced by the
relationship of King and Parliament, they were consciously attempting to develop new institutions and new institutional arrangements.
Yoo is right that the key congressional power was (and remains) the power of the purse. And while the President is assigned the duty of Commander-in-Chief, it is Congress alone
that is charged with the power to “raise and support” armies and
navies; to tax and to spend. But why this arrangement? Why this
division? Was the division of authority the end itself? That is the
second part of the problem with Yoo’s argument. The purse is
still the most important and powerful weapon Congress has to
fight off an aggressive President. But it is far less potent and far
less meaningful than was the Parliamentary purse.7
For one thing, the United States in 1789 had no standing
army, and no taste for one either. It was in fact the lack of a
large and mobile standing army that delayed American entrance
into World War I, and again, a major problem in the months be4. Thomas Jefferson, letter to James Madison, March 15, 1789.
5. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison).
6. Id.
7. These themes are more fully explored in GORDON SILVERSTEIN, IMBALANCE
OF POWERS: CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY (1997).
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fore the United States entered the Second World War. But
thanks to the Cold War and a growing world role, the United
States now has more than 1.4 million uniformed troops on active
duty, 24-hours a day, 365-days-a-year, with nearly another million active-reserves and spends more than $400 billion a year to
supply and support those troops. This money can be cut off, of
course, but not easily. Congress, Yoo blithely asserts, “can always cut off the funding for military adventures” by “simply refusing to appropriate new funds or constructing offensive weapons systems.” This “effective check on the President’s powers,”
Yoo approvingly concludes “renders unnecessary any formal
process requirement for congressional authorization or a declaration of war before hostilities may begin” (p. 294).
It is one thing to assert that Congress can use the power of
the purse to control foreign policy. That is certainly true. But
this is not an easily targeted—or easily deployed—weapon.
“Congress can simply defund” weapons systems, or military adventures, Yoo asserts. They can in theory—but can they so easily
in fact? Here Yoo skates over the critical distinction political scientists worry about all the time—power.
There is a distinct difference between legal authority to cut
funds (which Congress unquestionably retains) and the ability
actually to exercise that power. Yoo certainly is right that Congress has the authority to “use its power of the purse to counter
presidential warmaking” (p. 152); that Congress has the authority to “cut off the funding for military adventures” (p. 294); and
Congress has the authority to stop wars “merely by refusing to
appropriate the funds to keep the military operations going” (p.
13). But authority is not effective power. Does Congress actually, credibly have the ability to use this overwhelming weapon?
It is important for legal scholars to decide who has what formal
legal authority, but if we are looking at an evolving set of institutions, as Yoo insists we must when it comes to foreign policy,
then we must consider not only the weapons each branch brings
to the battle, but their ability to use those weapons effectively.8
We should “keep in mind the distinction between two
senses in which the word power is employed,” Richard Neustadt
wrote in 1960. One sense is when it is used “to refer to formal

8. Yoo endorses a living constitution when it comes to foreign policy. Modern
practice in foreign affairs, he writes, falls “within the bounds set by the constitutional text
and structure.” And he finds “that the constitutional text and structure provide far more
flexibility to the president and Congress than has been commonly understood” (p. 10).
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constitutional, statutory or customary authority” and the other is
in the “sense of effective influence on the conduct of others.”9
Harry Truman’s famous musing about the frustration former
General Dwight Eisenhower would feel when he took over as
President illustrates this well. “He’ll sit here,” Truman said of
Eisenhower, “and he’ll say, ‘Do this! Do that!’ And nothing will
happen. Poor Ike—it won’t be a bit like the Army. He’ll find it
very frustrating.”10
What was the purpose of the allocation of power in 1789?
Was it simply a lawyerly exercise in dividing an estate, assigning
specific duties to each branch and then leaving it to those parties
to negotiate adjustments in these assignments? Or, was it meant
to structure and maintain a balance of power between the
branches? If the later, then the ways in which Congress has become less able to wield this weapon is critical—and clearly out of
keeping with the original understanding.
Does Congress have the authority to cut off funds in the
middle of a war? Yes. But can Congress do so? Does it have the
power to do so? Consider what only recently befell Jack Murtha,
Member of Congress from Pennsylvania when he suggested that
the United States begin to curtail its involvement in Iraq in November, 2005. This 37-year career Marine Corps Officer, and
holder of two Purple Hearts, a Bronze Star and a Distinguished
Service Medal from the Marine Corps was accused, on the Floor
of the United States House of Representatives, of being a traitor
to his country—by another Member of Congress. And while
Representative Jean Schmidt (R-OH) quoted a constituent who
wanted Murtha to know “that cowards cut and run, and Marines
never do,” and House Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-IL) said
Murtha and his Party ‘‘want us to wave the white flag of surrender to the terrorists of the world.’’
The Vietnam War is another case on point. The famous
Tonkin Gulf resolution was used by Presidents Johnson and
Nixon as a clear endorsement of their management of the war.
When Congress finally repealed the Act, in June, 1970, it made
no difference at all. Nixon continued to pursue the war for another three years, while Members tried to cut off funds. They
were unable to do so for three years. But not for lack of will, but
rather because of an institutional feature that Yoo ignores.
9. RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN
PRESIDENTS 321 n.3 (Free Press ed., 1990) (1960).
10. Id. at 9.
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It takes just a simple majority to hand power to the president—but to take it back almost certainly will require a vetooverride. In other words, there is a powerful ratchet effect
here—it requires 50-percent plus one to give power away, but 66
percent is required to get it back again. Does this change the fact
that Congress has the formal authority to stop a war with the
power of the purse? No. But it certainly changes our understanding of their ability to use that power. Congress faces not only intense political constraints on its ability to use this power, but institutional limits that no King or Parliament ever “would have”
or ever “could have” recognized.
For many, John Yoo’s name has become synonymous with
torture. This is both fair, and unfair. It is unfair since Yoo surely
does not advocate torture, but it is fair since it was his legal work
that laid the constitutional justification for the Bush administration’s declaration that the Geneva Accords on the Treatment of
Prisoners would not apply to non-uniformed combatants captured in the war on terror in Iraq and Afghanistan, or for that
matter, anywhere in the world. It was his work again that was relied upon by the Administration in justifying it’s reinterpretation
of the United Nations Convention against torture.
The Powers of War makes no mention of torture, save an
oblique reference in the preface. But it very clearly lays out a
constitutional theory to justify the President’s unilateral decisions on the applicable treaties and conventions. In essence, Yoo
argues, the President alone has a virtually unconstrained power
not only to negotiate treaties, but to interpret them, and abrogate them at his discretion.
“Treaties represent a central tool for the exercise of the
president’s plenary control over the conduct of foreign policy,”
Yoo writes, and “in the course of protecting national security,
recognizing foreign governments, or pursuing diplomatic objectives, the president may need to decide whether to perform,
withhold, or terminate U.S. treaty obligations” (p. 184) He insists that this conclusion is bolstered by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in a dispute over President
Carter’s decision to abrogate the American defense treaty with
Taiwan in order to advance relations with the People’s Republic
of China. And Yoo is quite right about the Appeals Court’s ruling. He focuses on the finding in this case—a victory for the
President. He does not, however, pay much attention to the Supreme Court’s ruling in this case. As a matter of law, that may be
fine, but as a matter of constitutional interpretation, it’s a prob-
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lem. Despite the fact that the Supreme Court dismissed the case,
a number of Justices took the extraordinary action of filing opinions.
Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) insisted that the Senate
has a constitutional right to a role in treaty terminations. The
Appeals Court ruled that though Goldwater had standing to sue,
the President was within his constitutional authority. But not because of a prerogative power to terminate treaties, but mostly
because the treaty in question lacked any sort of specific termination clause calling for a Senate role. In other words, the Senate had failed to reserve for itself a role in treaty termination.
More important, the Court suggested, was the fact that the Senate as a body had made no effort to assert that right since
Carter’s decision. In essence, the Appeals Court held that the
Senate had the political weapons it needed to fight Carter’s decision, but had chosen not to use them. Thus the court would not
do what the Senate was unwilling to do for itself.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Justices split, and ordered the suit dismissed, but failed to arrive at any clear rationale.11 Justice Powell’s opinion, however, emphasized that the
case was not “ripe.” The Senate, he argued, had not acted and
therefore there was no actual case or dispute between the
branches. Justices Rehnquist, Stewart, Burger and Blackmun argued that the suit should be dismissed as a political question,
while only Justice Brennan dissented, arguing that the case was
ripe, and justiciable, and that the President did indeed have the
constitutional authority to do what he had done.
Justice Powell insisted that the Court would not rule in disputes between the President and Congress “unless and until each
branch has taken action asserting its constitutional authority”
but “if the President and the Congress had reached irreconcilable positions,” then the Court would have “to provide a resolution pursuant to our duty ‘to say what the law is.’”12
This suggests far greater constitutional ambiguity in the
treaty clause then Yoo perceives. But it complements his case
for broad Executive prerogative in war and foreign policy. If
Yoo’s primary objective in this book were simply to outline a
constitutional defense of Executive power in war and foreign
11. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). See also the more extensive discussion in the lower court consideration of this case, Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697
(1979).
12. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 996, 1001 (Powell, J., concurring).

!SILVERSTEINYOOREVIEW4.DOC

2005]

5/4/2006 5:57:31 PM

BOOK REVIEWS

109

policy, this book would have been easier to write, and a bit easier to read. There would be much more to debate in his historical
interpretation, in his selective reading of some of the key precedent cases and in his blithe assumptions about what the founding
generation “would have” or “could have” understood. But Yoo’s
ambition, and concern, is wider than just the scope of the war
power.
Yoo seems convinced that he has resolved the great conservative conundrum, finding a way to read the Constitution
broadly in foreign policy, and yet protect domestic politics from
the dangers inherent in big, efficient and central government.
This dilemma, which has bedeviled conservatives at least since
the First World War, was first articulated by a Republican Senator from Utah who would later go on to serve on the U.S. Supreme Court.
America’s belated and ill-prepared entry into World War I
provoked George Sutherland to struggle with this dilemma first
on the floor of the U.S. Senate,13 later in a collection of lectures
he gave at Columbia University after leaving the Senate (and
published in 1918, shortly before the end of the war),14 and then
in a series of Supreme Court cases in which then-Justice Sutherland articulated a doctrine of strictly limited power in domestic
affairs, and a very broad, centralized power in foreign policy.
Sutherland insisted that Americans had only three options
for the future. They could simply abandon the Constitution as
hopelessly out of date and inadequate to deal with modern dilemmas. They could stick with the traditional constitution,
strictly limiting the role of government across the board, and
abandon any role in world affairs. Or they would have to find a
way to read the same Constitution narrowly at home, and
broadly when it came to foreign policy.
Sutherland had a chance not only to offer his own theory
that might accomplish this last option—but he had the chance to
write it into law when Warren G. Harding put him on the U.S.
Supreme Court. A few years later, in a case called Curtiss-Wright
v. the United States, a case that is often quoted, and rarely studied, Sutherland did just that.

13. GEORGE SUTHERLAND, THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POWERS OF THE
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, S. DOC. NO. 61-417 (2d Session, 1909), later published as The
Internal and External Powers of the National Government, 191 N. AM. REV. 373 (1910).
14. GEORGE SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS AND WORLD AFFAIRS
(1919).
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Curtiss was a case about delegated powers—could Congress
delegate discretionary power to the President to cut off arms
sales to belligerents in a border fight between Paraguay and Bolivia? But the Curtiss-Wright company not only challenged the
delegation, but also argued that the national government lacked
constitutional authority to suspend their sales of machine guns
and planes to either country (or, as it happens, to both).
Sutherland, one of the “Four Horsemen” of the Supreme
Court devoted to federalism and actively employing the commerce and contract clauses of the Constitution to fend off government interference with individual liberty in general, and the
expansion of the national government into the states’ sphere in
particular, faced a real dilemma. To say the Constitution would
not permit the national government to act in foreign affairs
would be to essentially abandon any hope the U.S. might have to
play an effective world role. But, to say the national government
had this broad power might fundamentally undermine the very
limits Sutherland insisted on in domestic cases ranging from
Carter v. Carter Coal to Schechter.15
“The question which does arise is startlingly simple and direct,” Sutherland wrote. “May the power be exercised by governmental agency at all? A negative answer to this question in
any given case, it will be seen, might be of the most serious consequence. . . . Any rule of construction which would result in curtailing or preventing action on the part of the national government in the enlarged field of world responsibility which we are
entering, might prove highly injurious or embarrassing.”16
Historian Walter LaFeber argues that this dilemma “was
perhaps the central problem challenging the Constitution as the
United States became a global power between the 1890s and
1920.”17
Curtiss-Wright was Sutherland’s answer: The Constitution,
he insisted, was to be read differently in foreign and domestic affairs. Foreign policy powers are sovereign powers, Sutherland
wrote, and since sovereignty is and must be indivisible, those
powers passed whole and intact from the national government of
Britain (King and Parliament) to the national government of the

15. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
16. Sutherland, supra note 14, 20–21.
17. Walter LaFeber, The Constitution and United States Foreign Policy: An Interpretation, in THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN LIFE 51 (David Thelan ed., 1988).
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United States—first to the Continental Congress and then to the
national government under the Constitution—Congress and the
President, together. Domestic power, by contrast, passed from
King and Parliament to the separate states. The states, in turn,
then delegated specific, limited and enumerated powers to the
national government.
Even for Sutherland, foreign policy powers had limits. And
while the authority of Congress together with the President’s
own powers were broad and deep, they “like every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution.”18
But how to prevent this strong national power in foreign affairs from coming home? Sutherland’s theory depended on a
critical firewall, a clear constitutional barrier. And it relied upon
a vigilant patrol to protect that barrier. This seemed quite plausible in 1936, with the Supreme Court steadfastly deploying the
Commerce and Contract clauses to block any excess national
power from eroding federalism and individual liberty. But just
one year later, in 1937, the barrier was breeched, and the firewall
punctured.
Sutherland’s solution couldn’t even outlast his own tenure
on the Court. But that has not stopped conservatives from continuing to struggle to find a way to solve this dilemma. Far from
disappearing, the problem has taken on new dimensions in the
post-Cold War world of globalization. “Just as nationalization
created a demand for regulation of the economy at the national
level,” Yoo writes, “so too globalization has increased the need
for regulation at the international level” (p. 301).

18. Curtiss-Wright v. United States, 222 U.S. 304, 321 (1936). Though Sutherland is
regularly cited as doctrinal support for a theory of prerogative war powers for the President, his earlier writing and lectures suggest that his concern really was national power
(Congress and President together) and not prerogative powers for the President. In his
earlier lectures and the published versions of these talks, there is clear evidence that
Sutherland saw a far more limited role for the President. “The war powers, with the exception of those pertaining to the office of Commander-in-Chief, are vested in Congress,” Sutherland wrote in 1910, “and that body must exercise its own judgment with
respect to the extent and character of their use. The advice and counsel of the President
should be given great weight, but the acceptance of the President’s recommendations
must be the result of intelligent approval and not of blind obedience.” See GEORGE
SUTHERLAND, THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POWERS OF THE
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, S. DOC. NO. 61-417, at 76 (2d Sess. 1909), cited and
discussed in Roy Brownell, The Coexistence of United States v. Curtiss-Wright and
Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer in National Security Jurisprudence, 16 J.L. & POL.
1, 17 n.37 (2000).
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A national government empowered to conduct foreign affairs is also a national government empowered to bind the country and its people to international commitments and obligations
that might erode sovereignty, and subject individual citizens to
the long reach of international regulatory regimes, rules and laws
over which they might have very little if any control. These risks
range from resource allocations to pollution limits; from the
threats of international criminal law to international restrictions
on the use of capital punishment by state courts. As Yoo puts it,
the “problems of globalization have prompted the formation of
international institutions designed to coordinate a multilateral
policy solution. As these international institutions increase in
number and authority, they will place increasing pressure on the
Constitution’s structures for democratic decisionmaking and accountability” (p. 299).
Under John Yoo’s theory this problem is even more acute
since he staunchly defends not only broad national power, but
nearly unfettered Executive power in war and foreign policy.
How then to guarantee that a president constitutionally empowered in this way can’t easily exercise these vast powers to enter
into agreements that will open America and Americans to the
risks of global regulation?
Professor Yoo spends the first half of his book articulating a
strong, vibrant, living constitution, and assigning virtually unlimited powers to the President. How then to prevent that muscular
White House from entering into all sorts of international agreements that might bind Americans and sacrifice their sovereignty
whether over trade, environmental regulation or international
criminal proceedings?
The answer for Yoo is the Treaty Clause—again, properly
understood. The Treaty Clause is part of Article II—the Executive Powers. Yes, treaties require the advice and consent of two
thirds of the U.S. Senate, but it is an Executive power, meaning
the president has the power to negotiate treaties; the power to
interpret them, and, Yoo insists, the power to abrogate them at
will and without Senate or House participation. Over time, a
second instrument has emerged—congressional-executive
agreements. These are simple statutes, with a simple majority
vote in each house. Each has its advantages, and they have been
largely used as convenience and efficiency dictated.
But that’s the problem—and the solution, Yoo says. Unlike
the war powers, where he embraces “current practice,” here Yoo
insists on far more technical precision. Treaties are still required
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where the nation is making broad commitments overseas to political and military agreements. But where international agreements will have direct domestic effect, Yoo says, Congress must
be involved. Without enabling legislation, Presidents cannot do
by treaty what they otherwise would need a statute to accomplish. This would include trade agreements, regulations concerning fuel emissions, or health standards, the jurisdiction of international criminal courts, or any obligation that will require new
taxes, for example.
This seems a neat and clean line. But it’s not. The line between classic politico-military agreements (which Yoo says require a treaty and a super-majority in the Senate) and obligations with direct domestic effect is fast eroding in our global age.
What this means is that Yoo has constructed is his own powerratchet: Since more and more international obligations blur the
classic line between what Yoo asserts is Executive dominance of
foreign affairs, and those with direct domestic effects, one suspects that we will increasingly be obliged to secure both the twothirds vote in the Senate needed for a treaty and a majority vote
in both Houses for enabling legislation to bind the nation and its
citizens. On the other hand, since Yoo insists that the President
has a virtually unfettered power to interpret and abrogate treaties once made, it will become exceedingly hard to bind the nation, and exceedingly easy to get out of those limits. George
Sutherland would be proud.
But has Yoo solved the great conservative conundrum? Has
he found a way to have his cake (broad, nearly unfettered executive power in foreign affairs) and eat it too (by making sure that
this expansive power cannot easily come home to threaten sovereignty and limited domestic power)? Can we really find a way
to bifurcate the constitution and yet prevent foreign policy powers from blowing back and undermining individual liberty? The
evidence suggests that we cannot.
Both Sutherland and Yoo share a sincere concern for individual liberty. This is the root of their desire to cabin national
power. But the problem is that artificially splitting the Constitution into a document of broad foreign policy powers assigned to
the national government (Sutherland) or the President (Yoo) actually exposes us to a far more dangerous threat to liberty—it is
the danger that these extraordinary, extra-constitutional powers
in foreign policy can, will, and already have come home to undermine civil liberties.
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If a President enjoys unchecked power in foreign affairs to
assure national security, if, as Yoo says, we should assume that
the Constitution was designed to produce “the most effective
exercise of national power necessary to achieve those foreign
policy objectives” (p. 20), then what is to prevent a President
from asserting that national security abroad requires (and empowers the Executive) to violate civil liberties at home?
This isn’t a hypothetical. It’s already happened. First, and
most prominently, during the Nixon administration. And now,
some fear, it is happening again in the open, through statutes
like the Patriot Act, and in secret in ways we will only find out
about years from now.
Richard Nixon had no hesitation in asserting that national
security abroad constitutionally expanded his power at home. In
a 1977 interview, Nixon claimed the Constitution authorized the
President to break the law. As Nixon put it, “when the president
does it, that means that it is not illegal.” If the President, Nixon
added, “approves something because of the national security . . .
then the president’s decision in that instance is one that enables
those who carry it out, to carry it out without violating a law.
Otherwise they’re in an impossible position.”19
This argument was actually advanced in Court, in a 1971
case called U.S. v. Smith, where Nixon Administration lawyers
insisted that the President, acting through his Attorney General,
“has the inherent constitutional power (1) to authorize, without a
judicial warrant, electronic surveillance in “national security”
cases; and (2) to determine unilaterally whether a given situation
is a matter within the concept of national security.20 The Court
rejected these claims, and ordered the government to surrender
the transcripts of their surveillance to the defendant. But the
point is to suggest that far from being the post-hoc rationalization of a President forced to resign his office, these were very
much the work product of the Justice Department in 1971—and
they are no less likely to be the sorts of arguments the current
Justice Department is offering today. And while the courts rejected these arguments in the early 1970s, will today’s courts,
heavily staffed by the George W. Bush administration, see things
the same way?
The problem here is that John Yoo, like Sutherland before him, is attempting to find a way to split a unitary constitu19. Richard Nixon, interview with David Frost, May 19, 1977.
20. United States v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 424, 426, (1971).

!SILVERSTEINYOOREVIEW4.DOC

2005]

5/4/2006 5:57:31 PM

BOOK REVIEWS

115

tion in two. But that is a dangerous task, since the Constitution is
a delicate machine, designed to work as an integrated whole. If
the machine is unable to cope with modern conditions, then we
really should tear it down and build a more appropriate device.
As Thomas Jefferson noted, we should not look at constitutions
“with sanctimonious reverence, and deem them like the ark of
the covenant, too sacred to be touched.”
But before we call a new Constitutional convention, we
should remember that the “doctrine of the separation of powers
was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.”21 And,
indeed, as Justice William O. Douglas wrote, we “pay a price for
our system of checks and balances, for the distribution of power
among the three branches of government.”22 If that price seem
too exorbitant, if September 11 has dramatically altered our priorities, then we need a new constitution. But we should not be
trying to force a bifurcated constitution out of a unitary and balanced system of government. We end up undermining the system as it was designed, as it was meant to be, and as it was and
ought to be understood.

21. Justice Brandeis, Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926).
22. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 633 (1952) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).

